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Introduction
In  this chapter we discuss explanations for the diversity of behavior of 
contemporary forager populations. Other contributors document vari­
ation among southern African savanna Bushman groups, and central 
African forest Pygmies. We confine ourselves to trying to explain some 
differences between two savanna groups who have been studied quanti­
tatively, the Hadza and the !Kung. We further confine ourselves to 
discussing two kinds of explanation that are currently considered to be 
opposed to one another, behavioral ecology (Smith and Winterhalder 
1992), and political economy/historical revisionism as presented to 
hunter-gatherer researchers by Wilmsen (1989). We believe that 
explaining variation in human behavior is a major aim of anthropology, 
and that success in this task is a good test o f any anthropological theory.
We choose the Hadza foragers of northern Tanzania (Woodburn 
1968a, 1988 and elsewhere) because we work with them (O ’Connell et al. 
1988a, b, 1990, 1991; Hawkes et al. 1989, 1991; Blurton Jones et al. 
1989, 1992). We choose the !Kung of north-western Botswana because 
so much quantitative work on their behavior in the 1960s and early 
1970s has been published (Lee and DeVore 1976; Lee 1979; Howell
1979). Both live in sub-Saharan African savanna, exploiting some of the 
same plant and animal genera, hunting with bow and poison arrows, and 
collecting with digging stick and kaross. While other authors attend to 
variation within a single culture, we generalize here, to compare two 
cultures. Except when reporting census data, when we write “Hadza” 
we mean those we have worked with between 1984 and 1992, living in 
the T l i ’ika region of Hadza country.
We limit our main effort to explaining five points of difference 
between the Hadza and the !Kung:
1 Hadza children collect food for themselves while !Kung children 
seldom do (Blurton Jones et al. 1989; Obst 1912 and many others 
since; Draper 1976; Draper and Cashdan 1988).
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2 Hadza women are more fertile than !Kung forager women (Blurton 
Jones et al. 1992; Howell 1979).
3 Hadza seem to be less responsive parents than !Kung.
4 !Kung men use various traps and acquire much small game; Hadza 
men rarely trap, they specialize in big game (Lee 1979; Hawkes et al. 
1991).
5 Relations between men and women are described as segregated, or 
oppositional among the Hadza (particularly during the dry season) 
(Woodburn 1968a:52) but egalitarian among the !Kung (Kolata 1974; 
Draper 1975).
The previous accounts of the Hadza, some dozen reports of fieldwork 
from Bauman (1894) and Obst (1912) onward, show that throughout 
the past hundred years the Hadza have known and been known to their 
several neighboring tribes, and have traded with them. Much has 
changed in the surrounding countryside and the neighbors have moved 
ever closer, yet numerous aspects of Hadza behavior have not changed 
(Blurton Jones et al. in press; Woodburn 1979, 1988).
Political economy and evolutionary ecology
In  Land Filled with Flies, Wilmsen (1989) presents his favored political 
economic explanations of contemporary forager behavior as directly 
opposed to ecological explanations. Furthermore, he criticizes any 
school of anthropology that perceives people as isolated and pristine, 
and that divides them into “ tribes” to be understood without reference 
to their neighbors. He promotes the view that contemporary foragers 
should not be seen as inhabiting an unchanging and self-contained 
world in which people live in peaceful equilibrium with each other and 
their environment. He argues that contemporary hunters and gatherers 
are best regarded as “ the rural proletariat,” products of a global process 
of economic depredation. As such they are not “ living fossils,” and, he 
suggests, they have nothing to teach us about prehistoric hunting and 
gathering societies. He claims that anthropology has served merely to 
fuel the continuing deprivation of these peoples.
It is important for anthropology to respond to W ilmsen’s challenges. 
Surprisingly, the debate (e.g., Solway and Lee 1990) has so far concen­
trated on local history and geography and included little discussion of 
the nature of the explanations given by political economists or com­
parison with the explanations given by other anthropologists, including 
ecologists. This issue is important because the debate between anthro­
pologists and “revisionists/critical theorists” about contemporary for­
agers is a compact example of the wider debate in the social and
160 N . Blurton Jones, K . Hawkes a n d j. O ’Connell
Global process and local ecology 161
behavioral disciplines, where the debate is also often seen as argument 
for or against science. As researchers who feel the study of human 
behavior has suffered from too little science, our aim here is to join the 
debate on the side of anthropology in general and one kind of ecological 
paradigm in particular, that derived from evolutionary ecology. None­
theless, we are ambivalent about the task for two reasons. First, we too 
disagree with much in the earlier “ecological” presentations of the 
!Kung (see Hawkes and O ’Connell 1981; Hawkes, O ’Connell, Hill and 
Charnov 1985; and Blurton Jones et al. 1994a). Second, we hesitate lest 
we encourage a fallacious philosophy of science. We have in mind the 
common claim to have tested “the evolutionary explanation” of some 
piece of human behavior, disproved it, and thus shown that the evolu­
tionary ecology enterprise should be abandoned. This claim neglects the 
distinctions between paradigm, theory, models, and hypotheses. Any 
particular “test” concerns one hypothesis, drawn by a certain model 
(explicit or intuitive), dependent on its particular starting assumptions 
and simplifications, employing the particular logic by which its pre­
dictions are derived from its assumptions. Many other tests are possible 
within the same paradigm and with the same overarching or unifying 
assumption. We illustrate such a case when we consider the Maynard- 
Smith models of mate desertion, and then the “show-off hypothesis.” 
Both are used here to try to explain similar features of men’s behavior. 
Both ultimately assume that people tend to behave in ways that maxi­
mize their reproductive success. But other starting assumptions differ, 
and the models attend to slightly different sets of observables. T he two 
explanations usefully compete with each other. While one explanation 
can claim to account for more observations than the other, neither can 
claim to represent “the evolutionary explanation.”
The same point could be made for Wilmsen’s combination of 
political economy and critical theory. While we deal with some specific 
hypotheses close to his views, he can certainly develop others, which 
attend to other differences in the factors affecting the Hadza, and 
which suggest testable outcomes. No one should think that when we 
make a prediction by trying to take a political economy perspective, and 
find the prediction fails, we have “ disproved political economy!” But 
the existence and competition of different hypotheses within a theory or 
family of explanations does not prevent us from comparing the perfor­
mance of the two larger paradigms. Over the long term, which paradigm 
generates most rigorously testable hypotheses from its few basic 
assumptions, and by the most explicit logic? Over the long haul, which 
generates the greatest number of hypotheses that endure the test of real- 
life observations? (Those critical theorists who believe that the scientific
method, and the guidance scientists take from philosophers of science, 
are merely instances of the devices by which the ruling class maintain 
their power, will disallow this contest.)
Thus in this chapter we begin to examine how each paradigm copes 
with the task of accounting for differences between the Hadza and the 
!Kung. We compare the ability of these paradigms to generate correct 
predictions. But this cannot be more than the first round of a longer 
term contest. As it happens, we conclude that the two paradigms have 
much in common, and either could easily be modified so as to become a 
component of the other.
Our effort is severely handicapped by the obscurantism with which 
authors such as Wilmsen write. We can only debate that which we under­
stand. Perhaps we can provoke revisionists into being more explicit 
about their theory of human behavior, their methodology, and their 
criteria for distinguishing truth from falsehood. Fortunately other 
authors, such as Denbow (1990), have provided clear hints about their 
theory of human behavior. Their basic argument appears to be that all 
people respond opportunistically to the situations that confront them, 
and that primary among these are the opportunities presented by neigh­
bors and their neighbors in turn. People seek to make the most of these 
opportunities, and in doing so change the opportunities available to each 
other. On the whole, people with more wealth and power are able to 
influence the interaction more than the poor and less powerful. A chain 
of interactions links the most powerful to the weakest in a global process 
of exploitation of the poor by the rich (“global process theory”). It seems 
to us that it takes little extension of this view to include the opportunities 
(costs and benefits) provided by the environment, or by members of the 
same “mother tongue group” (tribe!). Nor does it take much extension of 
ecological approaches to add neighbors and others as influences upon 
the costs and benefits of different courses of action. T he combination of 
the two sets of factors is illustrated by several chapters in this book.
T he version of ecology that we pursue (that based on evolutionary 
ecology: see Smith and Winterhalder 1992), and which we illustrate in 
the first half o f the chapter, differs from the ecology that Wilmsen has in 
mind. His criticism, though expressed as generally “anti-ecology,” 
seems specially targeted at an ecology he understands to view foragers as 
Rousseau-esque “originally affluent,” primevally peaceful, unwilling to 
change, or incapable of it. W e, and most of those who apply evolutionary 
ecology principles to the study of human behavior, see individuals as 
more restless, opportunistically (but often unconsciously) weighing 
costs and benefits o f different behavior in their current circumstances, 
and behaving in a way that maximizes production of descendants -  a
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“reproductive strategy.” Our approach is like an economics in which 
descendants are seen as a more important currency than dollars. This 
perspective has guided much recent field work, especially on hunters 
and gatherers (reviewed by Smith and Winterhalder 1992; Smith 1992; 
Borgerhoff-Mulder 1991; Cronk 1991).
The settings
The IKung and their social and material circumstances are so well 
known to anthropologists that we will not describe them here, except to 
make an initial contrast between “ remoteness” and “ isolation.” 
Wilmsen has presented evidence against the view that the Dobe IKung 
were isolated from the events of the world around them. I f  lack of 
isolation can be claimed for the geographically remote IKung, we must 
expect it to be shown easily for the geographically accessible Hadza. 
Until the mid-1980s, the Botswana-based anthropologist visiting the 
IKung had a two-day journey from Maun, the nearest market-town, 
where there was a small airfield, finally crossing a 100-km waterless 
stretch to reach the Dobe area. In  complete contrast, the Hadza 
researcher has a drive of a mere six hours from an international airport, 
and only about two hours from either the district capital or a major 
tourist route to a point where he may find Hadza who gain much of their 
food by hunting and gathering. While this clearly shows that the Hadza 
cannot be described as either remote or isolated, it gives us little clue 
about their relationships with non-Hadza. Woodburn (1988) describes 
the remarkable extent to which the Hadza have kept themselves separate 
from others. We support his observation of Hadza inclinations. Even in 
those regions of Hadza country where non-Hadza have settled most 
densely, Hadza seem eager to keep to themselves.
Archaeological evidence suggests the periodic presence of farmers 
and herders in the Hadza area for several centuries, and of hunter- 
gatherers for far longer (Mehlman 1988). Among this evidence is the 
presence of rock construction irrigation channels at Endamagha (Sutton 
1986). Rainfall in the rift valley floor inhabited by the Hadza is much 
lower than in the surrounding highlands. M ost successful agriculture in 
the area today depends on irrigation. W ritten historical evidence, dating 
only from the memories of Obst’s (1912) informants, is unclear about 
the presence of herders, although it does suggest that few, if any, 
farmers lived within the area Hadza describe as their country. Since 
then there has been an accelerating influx of herders, farmers, charcoal 
traders, and gemstone miners. T he influx has been greatest in the 
Mangola and Siponga regions (Figure 7.1). Herders and farmers moved
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Figure 7.1 Map of Lake Eyasi area marking locations named in the 
text. Names by which Hazda refer to regions of their country are 
marked in italic script. The approximate line of the 1500-meter 
contour is marked by the partly double line. Sections of this line that 
run SW to NE approximately correspond to the rift escarpments
into both. Higher parts of Siponga have now been reduced to bare rock 
beneath thorn scrub. Charcoal traders have felled most of the Balai 
valley trees and berry groves. T he Balai delta is the home of a thriving 
onion industry with trucks calling daily. A prison is sited nearby at 
Enti.
Hadza told Obst (1912) that they hunted and gathered as long ago as 
anyone had heard about. But Obst claimed that among the Hadza words 
for domestic animals, only that for goat was a loan, suggesting an 
agricultural past. Others (Dempwolff 1916-17; Berger 1943) claim most 
such words as loans from one or another of the representatives of the 
several major language families (Bantu, Cushitic, and Nilotic) in the 
surrounding countryside. T he persistence of Hadzane as a language 
whose affinity to any other is still under debate means that Hadza have 
been distinct from all these neighbors for a very long time indeed. But
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their separateness does not tell us that they always lived only by hunting 
and gathering.
Few tourists come to Hadza country but it is a game-controlled area 
and commercial hunting outfits use it in some years for foreign clients. 
Since at least Bagshawe’s day (1917-23, see Bagshawe 1923) game 
officials have not restricted Hadza hunting with traditional weapons, 
except to ask them not to kill giraffes and elephants, and not to trade 
meat. Poachers seem to visit the area from time to time, and Hadza 
sometimes get meat from the animals that the poachers kill. There may 
be more illegal hunting by non-Hadza than this suggests. We have met 
and heard tell of unknown trucks with armed people. Frequent hunting 
visits are made by non-Tanzanian residents. At the turn of the century, 
Obst’s informants describe raids by Isanzu who came to hunt elephants, 
and who also captured women and children. Sukuma hunting parties 
were smaller and negotiated “permission” to hunt in exchange for iron 
goods. Hadza have made arrowheads and knives from iron obtained by 
barter as far back as we have written accounts (1910).
T he Datoga herder neighbors of the Hadza seem to make little 
demand for Hadza labor and do not practice the mafisa system that 
allows !Kung a chance to acquire livestock. Hadza experiences with 
livestock and with the Datoga have been traumatic, as discussed later in 
this chapter. A few Hadza have one or two chickens; one elderly woman 
tried to keep some in remote bush camps for a while. Not many dogs are 
kept, but recently two survived in bush camps for several years. 
Although some Hadza at the south of their range have farmed for some 
decades, fewer currently do so. We know of no Hadza who owns a goat, a 
sheep, a cow, or a donkey.
The demand for Hadza labor from farmers and others seems small, 
and it is locally variable. Some Hadza take seasonal employment 
guarding maize fields from animals, for which they extract payment in 
maize as well as the marauding game. Some take occasional employment 
harvesting sweet potatoes. Over the past twenty years or so, two German 
farmers have been favored sources of temporary employment for Hadza, 
perhaps because they treat the Hadza with much more respect than do 
other non-Hadza. One of these employers has commented many times 
on the unusual honesty of his Hadza employees, an impression we can 
confirm by our totally unguarded bush camps. During the latest settle­
ment scheme about five young educated Hadza men were appointed as 
Community Development Assistants, which involved some form of 
payment.
The most conspicuous “outside” influence upon the Hadza in recent 
decades has been the string of settlement schemes, listed by McDowell
(1981) and Ndagala (1986). The number of people involved in each of 
these, and the length of time they stayed at a settlement, may have been 
exaggerated. None of these interludes of imposed village life lasted long. 
No generation of Hadza has grown up unfamiliar with life in the bush 
and the techniques of hunting and gathering. But probably no Hadza 
has failed to experience some version of village life. Indeed, many Hadza 
seem able to switch instantly and quite easily between village and bush, 
and to have done so for many years. T he Hadza ambivalence to settle­
ment and their loose and fleeting economic ties to neighbors set up a 
striking contrast to the rapid change described among the !Kung since 
the early 1970s. Should this contrast be explained by differences in the 
alternatives to foraging that the modern world has offered, or by differ­
ences in the opportunities provided by life in the bush?
We have shown here that there are ample manifestations of the 
“global process” impinging upon the Hadza. Yet, as Woodburn (1988) 
describes, the Hadza had until late 1988 in no way been swallowed up by 
it. But can we account for their behavior as reactions to this process? 
How many of the differences between the Hadza and the !Kung (as 
described by Lee 1979, Howell 1979, the authors in Lee and DeVore 
1976, and others) can be accounted for by the global process and the 
different forms it takes as it reaches down to each of these small rural 
populations? We will return to these questions after outlining the 
ecological explanations offered by our research.
An evolutionary ecology account
We claim that many differences between !Kung and Hadza behavior can 
be accounted for by the relatively simple idea of reproductive strategy. 
It should come as no surprise that fertility, child rearing, marriage, and 
sex roles should be intimately linked; their links to subsistence may be 
less obvious.
Children’s foraging
Hadza children forage, both accompanied by adults (Figure 7.2), and 
unaccompanied. Children aged 5-10  are able to acquire 200-600 kcal/hr 
and seem to contribute from a third to a half of their RD A  by their own 
efforts, and much more from age 12 onward (Figure 7.3). !Kung children 
did not forage at all (Draper 1976; Draper and Cashdan 1988). Blurton 
Jones et al. (1994a) report !Kung informants’ confirmations of this 
observation and their explanation for it -  children who try to forage 
without adults get lost in the flat and featureless landscape, and some
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Figure 7.2 Hazda women and children digging roots. Just beyond the 
horizon, a main road crosses the plateau atop the rift wall, bearing 
tourists to view game, and trucks to and from Lake Victoria
have died this way. Children who go with adults get tired and thirsty 
and want to go home, they “ spoil the work.” Blurton Jones et al. (1994b) 
present data that show how little food IKung children could acquire by 
foraging without adults, a strong contrast with the Hadza situation, 
which (like the risks of getting lost) arises from the botany and geo­
morphology of their habitats. Blurton Jones et al. present data and 
computations about children accompanying mothers on long trips to the 
nutgroves. The calculations show that, because nuts require lengthy 
processing (unlike the berries that Hadza children collect on equally 
long trips with adults), unless IKung children can carry a hefty load of 
nuts (with the unlikely absence of significant costs due to intense heat
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Figure 7.3 Some Hazda children processing baobab fruit in a camp
with no shade or water en route), they would be as much help to their 
mothers and siblings if they stayed home and spent some time cracking 
mongongo nuts, just as Lee reports that they do. Thus we claim to have 
presented evidence of an economic explanation for this difference, 
dependent on the distribution of food and water in the environment, and 
differences in the processing costs of the highest-return foods. We also 
suggest that this difference in children’s dependence on adults for food 
has important consequences for adult reproductive strategies.
Fertility
Hadza women living to menopause bear an average of 6.2 children 
(Dyson 1977; Blurton Jones et al. 1992). This is a great deal higher than 
the 4.7 reported by Howell (1979) for !Kung women who completed 
their childbearing years before 1968. The Hadza figure resembles 
the mean of forager and farmer populations summarized by Campbell 
and Wood (1988). The Hadza have been increasing quite fast while 
the !Kung population was scarcely growing at the time of Howell’s 
study.
Given limited resources, a fitness-maximizing parent is faced with a 
trade-off between number of offspring and the fitness of each offspring
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(Smith and Fretwell 1974; M cGinley and Charnov 1988; Lack 1966; 
Krebs and Davies 1987; Lessels 1991; Blurton Jones and Sibly 1978; 
Blurton Jones 1986, 1987; Pennington and Harpending 1988). Parental 
care enhances offspring fitness. Providing food keeps children alive, and 
enables them to grow larger and perhaps enhances their later reproduc­
tive success. But food given to one offspring is not available to another, 
nor is it available to the mother to supply her next pregnancy and 
lactation. We have argued (Blurton Jones et al. 1989) that Hadza 
children’s opportunity to feed themselves affects the mother’s trade-off 
between numbers and care of offspring. A Hadza mother who keeps 
more food for herself, or takes more rest, will threaten the growth and 
survival of her children over 5 years old much less than if she lived in the 
!Kung environment, where children do not have the same opportunities 
for making up the shortfall by their own efforts. We thus expected 
Hadza women to bear more babies than !Kung women, and our demo­
graphic studies show that they do. But there are other important bio­
logical explanations of variation in fertility, two of which involve influ­
ences from neighbors. Although these have long been discussed in 
anthropology, they are the kind of “external” influence to which “ global 
process theory” makes us sensitive.
Does the average Hadza woman bear more children than the average 
!Kung woman because more Hadza women have spent more time in 
villages or settled around farmers? We showed that, on the contrary, age 
structure was younger among the most bush-living Hadza than in the 
population at large (Blurton Jones et al. 1992). Since age structure most 
readily reflects fertility, we conclude that “ settlement” is not the expla­
nation for Hadza having higher fertility than the !Kung.
Pennington (1992) suggested that !Kung fertility is low because of 
diseases of the reproductive tract. Bennett et al. (1973) reported a low 
incidence of treponemal antibodies in Hadza blood samples (but Hadza 
reported VD as a reason for having gone in search of outside medical 
help). Thus Hadza fertility might be higher because of less disease, or 
because of better access to medicine. T he suggestion about the !Kung is 
based on the observation of low fertility, albeit expressed as the propor­
tion of older women reporting that they had never borne a child (10 
percent !Kung, 2.5 percent Hadza 1990), on secondary sterility 
(Harpending 1994; Blurton Jones et al. 1994), and on arguments about 
the low fertility of the Herero herders early this century, when the 
evidence of venereal disease is absent and there is good evidence of 
extreme hardship due to the “ global process” (rinderpest, and fleeing 
into Botswana after losing a war with the Germans in South-West 
Africa).
Blurton Jones et al. (1994) concluded that T F R  (Total Fertility Rate) 
of forager !Kung women seemed to be uninfluenced by disease of the 
reproductive tract but was just over 5, higher than Howell’s 4.7 but still 
substantially lower than the Hadza 6.2. However, the VD explanation 
remains quite plausible, if  relatively untested. While immunological 
tests of exposure to gonorrhea and syphilis are possible and might 
confirm the theory, there are other, less easily identified diseases for this 
theory to fall back upon. Its mirror image -  availability of antibiotics -  
should be more testable, but in the case of the !Kung and Hadza, dating 
their arrival and availability in either location would be no mean feat of 
historical research (but a very interesting study of the global process).
Consequences fo r  maternal behavior?
Parental care enhances offspring fitness. Blurton Jones (1993) suggested 
that it might help us to think about parental behavior if we discriminate 
mother’s fertility, and two aspects of offspring fitness: survival, and 
later offspring reproductive success (O RS). Food is likely to enhance 
both (nutritionists believe that the effects of undernutrition on suscepti­
bility to disease is a major factor in child mortality in the Third World; 
biological life history theory suggests that growth rate has important 
effects on length and fertility of reproductive career (Hill 1983)). Provid­
ing food for her children might thus be expected to take precedence over 
other forms of care. But local circumstances may determine the actual 
benefits to mother’s fitness from different kinds of care (e.g., Ache 
women provide very little food but exert considerable effort to keep 
children from the dangers of the forest floor: Kaplan and Dove 1987). In 
populations with high mentality such as the Hadza and the !Kung we 
might expect care that enhances child survival to take precedence over 
care that enhances adult skills and competitive ability, such as teaching. 
Little direct teaching is seen in either society.
I f  the Hadza mother invests a larger portion of her resources, includ­
ing time, in her own fertility we may expect her to invest less in each 
child’s survival. I f  providing for offspring is less effective among the 
Hadza, then, other things being equal, we should also expect a little less 
time or energy to be spent in other forms of survival-enhancing care 
(Blurton Jones 1993; Rogers and Blurton Jones in prep.). Having a 
larger family, the Hadza mother may also invest more in care that affects 
all her offspring at once, care that needs no more effort for five children 
than for four. Thus we may be able to predict differences in child­
rearing practices or styles of parent-child interaction between the 
Hadza and the !Kung. T he Hadza do appear much less responsive, less
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vigilant, and more directive and punitive than the famously gentle 
!Kung parents described by Konner (1972, 1976), Bakeman et al. 
(1990), Barr et al. (1991), Draper (1976), and Draper and Cashdan 
(1988). Furthermore, Hadza parents allow, even command, children to 
take risks by fetching water, sometimes firewood, and even to approach 
and throw rocks at snakes. Alternative predictions can be derived from 
the trade-off between the low reproductive value of infants (who suffer 
high mortality and thus have less chance of reproducing) and the higher 
RV of children, and the smaller effect of parental care on the survival of 
older children. Among the !Kung, where children are so dependent 
upon adults for food, care directed to older children may have a rela­
tively greater effect on mother’s fitness than it would among the Hadza. 
This would suggest that the greatest difference between !Kung and 
Hadza parenting should be found in their behavior to older children.
Differences between behavior o f  IKung and H adza men
It has been traditional in much of anthropology (and psychology and 
other social sciences) to think of families as fully cooperating units, with 
men as providers and protectors of their wives and children. Indeed, 
among both IKung and Hadza, men and women seem to think of men in 
this way. This assumption has also been particularly prevalent and 
mostly unquestioned in discussion of “ evolutionary scenarios,” e.g., 
Lovejoy (1981). It has been challenged by Hawkes (1990; 1991; Hawkes 
et al. 1991), particularly in respect to the inability of this view to offer a 
convincing adaptive advantage to big-game hunting -  held to have been 
so formative in human evolution. Does the comparison of the IKung and 
the Hadza, and the proposed difference in consequences of parental 
provisioning, shed any light on men’s reproductive strategies?
Well-known models of mate desertion were set out for biologists by 
Maynard-Smith (1977). These models are mainly aimed at understand­
ing why there are some animal species in which males desert, others in 
which females desert, some in which the deserted partner stays to rear 
the offspring, and others where the deserted partner also deserts. They 
also predict differences in time spent with each “brood,” whether it is 
likely to be deserted earlier or later. One of these models attends to two 
parameters: (1) effects on offspring survivorship from desertion by 
father or mother; (2) opportunities for new matings or marriages by the 
deserting partner. Desertion depends on the trade-off between costs to 
the survival of offspring and the opportunities (and productivity, an 
important issue that may require a revised model for humans) of new 
matings. I f  there is no opportunity for increased reproduction by a new
mating, there is no benefit to set against even a slight cost to the survival 
of existing offspring that may result from desertion. An anthropological 
example was presented by Hurtado and Hill (1992), who compared 
Ache and Hiwi men.
We have already suggested that reduced effort by either parent should 
have less effect on Hadza children’s survival than on IKung children. I f  
we assume maternal care is more effective than paternal care, we will 
expect men to desert before women (unless this effect is overwhelmed 
by new matings promoting women’s reproductive success more than 
men’s). (This does not exclude other possibilities, such as a woman 
expelling her husband, which does not necessarily involve deserting her 
children.) Unless sex ratios are very different, or women are somehow 
taken out of circulation (e.g., by marriage to neighbors of richer tribes), 
the proposed weaker effect of Hadza parental care should lead us to 
expect Hadza men to invest less in their children with their current wife, 
desert more readily, and pursue alternative matings more energetically 
than IKung men.
I f  we take a further small step, from investing less in their children to 
a wider range of parental and “husbandly” behavior, we may expect 
Hadza men to be less inclined to be “homebodies” than IKung hus­
bands (more like “ Cads” and less like “Dads,” Draper and Harpending
1982). Some observations seem to confirm this expectation. IKung men 
make clothes, mortars and pestles, digging sticks, karosses (Lee 1979: 
table 9.1 and pp. 273-80), and also collect firewood. While we have seen 
Hadza men staking out and scraping skins, and occasionally picking up 
firewood as they return to camp, we have seldom seen a Hadza man sew 
more than a patch on his own clothes, and only rarely have men asked us 
for needles, often demanded of us by women. Hadza women make their 
own digging sticks and women regularly collect firewood. In any gather­
ing of Hadza, men and women divide into separate groups. Hadza men 
who are in camp during the daytime stay at a separate place on the edge 
of or outside camp where women seldom go (quantitative account in 
O’Connell et al. 1991). Hadza have frequent ceremonies conducted by 
men, which women may not attend. While small children are sometimes 
handed to Hadza men to care for at “the men’s place,” such care does 
not seem to last more than a few minutes. Quantitative information may 
correct the impression, but Hadza men seem to have much less inter­
action with small children than do IKung men. Hadza men do, however, 
make bows for their sons (aged 3 and up) and lend axes to older sons (10 
and up) to get honey.
This is a nice story but how much of it can be substantiated with 
further quantitative data? Two assumptions of the model were that a
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Hadza father has less effect on his children’s survival than a Hadza 
mother, and less effect than a !Kung father has on his children. We have 
already suggested that Hadza children’s foraging made them less 
dependent on parental care. We could furthermore point to the wide­
spread sharing of meat in both societies. Little of the big-game meat that 
a child eats comes from its own father. If, as appears to be the case, small 
game are less widely shared in each society, and !Kung men bring in 
more small game and gather 19 percent of the plant food (Lee 1979), 
then the !Kung father might be expected to have more effect on his 
children’s nutrition and survivorship. Is there any evidence of the 
effects of men upon their children’s survival?
Evidence about the !Kung has already been published by Howell 
(1979) and Pennington and Harpending (1988), but it is very indirect 
and, although based on large samples, these samples include a mixture 
of subsistence types. Howell, arguing from meat sharing as we did 
above, suggests that the effect of father on child survival would be very 
small. She compared the observed population with the number of !Kung 
of each age predicted by the a m b u sh  simulation to have a parent still 
living. T he simulation used the assumption that the mortality of a child 
is independent of mortality of its parent. The predicted number of 
people with a living father was very slightly lower than observed. This 
suggests !Kung fathers do have a small effect upon the survival of their 
offspring.
Pennington and Harpending (1988) compared survivorship of chil­
dren of women who had only one marriage (her husband survived and 
stayed) with those who had more than one marriage (at least one 
husband died or departed, and they show that most were cases in which 
the husband died). Child survivorship was significantly and sub­
stantially lower in the second group, from which these authors conclude 
that !Kung fathers have a significant and large effect upon child 
survivorship.
W e can offer direct, longitudinal data from the Hadza but on a very 
small sample. We have conducted two censuses of the Hadza, one in 
1985, another in 1991. We extracted the data on how many of the chil­
dren who were aged less than 5 in the 1985 census survived until 1991 
(Table 7.1). Among the eleven whose mothers died before 1991, only six 
survived. Despite the foraging success of the over-5s, mother seems very 
important to the survival of younger Hadza children. We next looked at 
the families in which father had died or left by 1991. There is no differ­
ence in the survivorship of under-5s between those whose father stayed 
and those whose father left or died; children of broken marriages always 
stayed with the mother if she was alive. Thus, if there is an effect of a
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Table 7.1. Survivorship o f  H adza children aged 5 or less in 1985 until 
1990
Parents together Father died Mother died Divorced or single mother
Child died 13 1 6 5
Child lived 38 10 5 20
Table 7.2. Ratios o f males to females among IKung (from Howell 1979) 
and H adza (IKung aged over 10 from  Howell p. 247 and mean o f three 
diagrams p. 40)
Men Women
Hadza total 340 366
Hadza aged 15—45 145 149
IKung aged over 10 91 100
IKung aged 15-45 53 47
Hadza father on the survivorship of his young children, it looks as if it is 
small (but we might expect desertions to be timed so as to reduce their 
effect on offspring mortality). These results are a strong contrast with 
Pennington and Harpending’s finding on the IKung.
Let us conclude that desertion is less costly for Hadza men than for 
IKung men. Now what about opportunities for remarriage? How many 
women are available? Personal tastes are likely to be as important among 
Hadza and IKung as among anyone else, but just as with Americans or 
Europeans, some of the variance may be accounted for by etic generali­
zations, including mere opportunity.
Table 7.2 shows that sex ratios are similar in the two populations; 
neither is significantly far from the usual. There is no obvious shortage 
of men or women in either society. Other issues may be more important, 
such as hypergamy, an effect o f neighbors. Bailey (1988) discusses the 
widespread tendency for hunter-gatherer women to marry richer men 
from other tribes, and reports extensively on this for the Efe. He reports 
Howell (pp. 233-4) as showing that fifteen out of 149 IKung women 
aged over 19 were married to Bantu men (10.07 percent). Including the 
15-19-year-old girls from Howell’s Table 12.1 (IKung girls commonly 
marry around 15) makes little difference (17/165 = 10.3 percent). Bailey 
reports that 13 percent of Efe women were married to villagers. The 
corresponding figure for Hadza in our 1985 census was 9/223 = 4 percent
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of Hadza women were married to villagers. This is a significant differ­
ence from the IKung (chi-squared = 6.07, df = 1, p < 0.025 > 0.01).
Thus the opportunities for a new marriage may be lower for a IKung 
man than for a Hadza man. The conditions under which the mate 
desertion models predict early desertion by males seem to hold more 
strongly among the Hadza than among the IKung. Not only does the 
departure of the Hadza cost him no increased child mortality but his 
opportunities for new matings seem to be greater than for a IKung man. 
(Since both cost to children and mating opportunity differ, we cannot 
attribute the difference between IKung and Hadza men to either factor 
alone. In  Hurtado and H ill’s (1992) comparison of Ache and Hiwi men, 
it appeared that differences in mating opportunity overwhelmed the 
differences in cost to children.) It would indeed seem that we may 
expect Hadza men, more than IKung men, to divert effort away from 
provisioning their offspring with their current wife and invest it in effort 
toward additional matings. In  so far as this strategy characterizes the 
“ Cad” more than the “Dad” and the “homebody,” the conditions fit 
the differences summarized above.
We might use these models to predict when men will leave, and who 
initiates divorce. I f  the IKung man has so much effect on his children’s 
survival then “Women who lose mates either to death or divorce appear 
to lose a resource significant to their fitness” (Pennington and Harpend- 
ing 1988:312). IKung women might be expected to try harder to keep 
their husbands and to be less inclined to leave them than Hadza women. 
These considerations might be relevant to understanding the apparently 
great “ power” of Hadza women.
The “show-off ” model
The model proposes four strategies, two for women, two for men. 
Although Hawkes (1990) uses the word “married,” we should empha­
size that the model attends not to residence, nor to social labels, but to 
sources of food and sexual access. Some women (“wives” W) limit their 
matings so that only m percent of their children are fathered by men 
other than their “husband,” an individual man whose strategy is that of 
provisioner; he acquires food to pass to his wife and her children and 
uses none of it to gain matings with other women. He tolerates the m 
percent of children to his “wife” fathered by other men (m can vary; in 
Hawkes’ 1990 model the experimenter varies m, but a provisioner might 
be expected to try to limit m in relation to the benefit gained by his own 
children from his wife’s lovers, the “ show-offs”).
These other men, show-offs, pursue big game to distribute the meat
widely and increase their chances of matings with a variety of women. 
These men may be tolerated, and their children may receive special 
treatment, in order to keep the flow of meat bonanzas coming. Hawkes 
denotes the special treatment as z, another given variable. Again we 
should develop some suggestions about conditions that would be 
expected to increase or reduce i. The cost of i to each of its donors would 
not be expected to exceed the benefit from their share of the bonanzas. 
Hawkes (1990) shows that under quite a wide range of these parameters, 
showing off is a strategy that can invade a population and persist.
Since only provisioners provide for and confine their matings to one 
female, and since men are either provisioners or show-offs, there will be 
fewer provisioners when there are more show-offs; some women cannot 
capture a provisioner for themselves, so we will expect more “unmar­
ried” women in a population with more show-off males. Thus if  we 
expect more Hadza men to adopt a show-off strategy than !Kung men, 
we should expect to find more single Hadza women than !Kung women, 
in so far as marriage or co-residence represents the W  strategy. We gave 
arguments for suggesting that Hadza men might be expected to direct 
more effort to matings and less to provisioning when compared to !Kung 
men. T he show-off strategy, hunting big game which can be widely 
distributed (even at cost of very high variance in hunting returns, 
Hawkes et al. 1991), is one way of directing effort to increased matings. 
The amount of big game available may influence the frequency of a 
show-off strategy. I f  little is available and it is caught extremely seldom, 
one would expect the balance to tip away from show-off and toward 
provisioner. Hawkes et al. (1991) showed that trapping small animals 
can lead to an almost daily but small supply of meat, probably a good 
strategy for a provisioner. T he ethnographies seem to show that !Kung 
catch many small animals that Hadza mostly ignore or eat in the bush 
rather than bring home.
Consequently, proposing that more Hadza men adopt a show-off 
strategy and more !Kung men play provisioner accounts for the observa­
tions reported above, and leads us to expect to find more unmarried 
Hadza women than !Kung women. In  our 1985 census there were 27 
unmarried Hadza women out of 110 women between the ages of 20 and 
45. Thus 24.5 percent of Hadza women of reproductive age were 
unmarried, despite the equal sex ratio. Howell (1979:234, table 12.1) 
shows 7 unmarried !Kung women out of 87 aged 20-45 , which is 8 
percent. Chi-squared is 9.23, df = 1, which gives p < 0.005. We do not 
really know whether the methods used to arrive at the counts of married 
and single women are comparable but it appears that there are sig­
nificantly more unmarried women of reproductive age among the Hadza
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than among the IKung. As with any confirmed prediction, we should 
remember that it might be possible to generate the prediction from 
hypotheses other than the one we used.
At first sight, our claim that the show-off strategy is more frequent 
among Hadza is contradicted by the Woodburn (1968b) and Kohl- 
Larsen (1958) reports of homicide as a normal response to adultery 
among the Hadza. But Kohl-Larsen’s discussion of adultery makes it 
clear that the response includes much flexibility. The matter is more 
easily settled if the husband has “a good heart,” or if the offender pays 
some retribution. The Hadza view of big-game hunting as reported by 
Woodburn (1968b), emphasizing reciprocity much more strongly, also 
seems not to coincide with ours. We are only just beginning to investi­
gate these issues among the Hadza. We hope to continue thinking, 
modeling, predicting, and testing. It should be evident that both sets of 
models suggest many issues to investigate.
The show-off model seems to account for the use of traps by IKung 
and their absence among the Hadza. Not only do the Hadza seldom trap 
(even though they know how to do it, and sometimes do so as children), 
but Obst (1912) reports them as viewing trapping as “unmanly.” Traps 
catch a reliable supply of small game (see also K ent’s figures from 
Kutse in chapter 6), which is a good technique for a provisioner 
(Hawkes et al. 1991). Hunting acquires large game. Whether the theory 
will ever give us any insight into the wider range of hunting techniques 
and social arrangements such as Pygmy net hunting, or the extensive 
game drives and large pit traps described by Guenther in chapter 3, is at 
present quite unclear.
It should be evident by now that we have generated a picture of IKung 
men’s interests as being closer to those of their womenfolk (if, as Hawkes 
argues from the show-off game, women do better by capturing a pro­
visioner than by manipulating show-offs) than are Hadza men’s inter­
ests. We think it is a small step from this to the description Woodburn 
gives of a degree of separateness and almost opposition between the 
sexes in Hadza society. He seems to regard this as one of the key features 
of Hadza social organization. While some have stressed the equality and 
relatedness of men and women in IKung society, no one has claimed 
unity or equality between the sexes for Hadza society. This is not to say 
that Hadza society is dominated by men. Hadza women vote with their 
feet quite effectively, and the obligations of son-in-law to mother-in-law 
that Woodburn describes seem to be very much in evidence. Older 
women (and some young women) have powerful and aggressive per­
sonalities, which anthropologists and male informants treat with awe!
Thus, although false confirmations may arise too easily in a com­
parison of just two populations, even though several of our predictions 
were genuine predictions to data awaiting analysis (e.g., effects of Hadza 
father’s death, number of unmarried Hadza women), and some links in 
our argument are weak, some are quite strong, and we have been able, 
working in the evolutionary ecology framework, to link many features of 
Hadza and IKung life, and offer explanations around the single idea of a 
trade-off between effort to promote survival of offspring and effort to 
generate more offspring. We are able to derive predictions from the 
framework, and find some support for them in the data.
“Global process theory”: another family of explanations
What can thinking about the global process add to our account of 
differences between the Hadza and the IKung? Does global process 
theory suggest we should attend to different costs and benefits? Does it 
offer alternative, competing explanations for the observations? O f 
course, however hard we try, we cannot generate hypotheses from global 
process theory as fruitfully as can its true proponents. Consequently, we 
restrict our discussion to a few ideas that can be found in the literature. 
The influence of neighbors was already implied in our discussions of 
settlements and venereal disease in connection with fertility, and hyper- 
gamy in connection with male strategies.
M en’s response to “hypergamy,” forager women marrying rich
neighbors
Hypergamy has been suggested as a reason for hunters emphasizing 
hunting, and resisting settlement. T he pressure of hypergamy might 
lead forager men, unable to compete in the village, to resist settlement 
and increase their emphasis on positive aspects of hunting and the forest 
life, such as the greater access to meat (Headland 1985; Bailey 1988). 
While the IKung seem to show no reluctance to farm or herd (given the 
chance), the Hadza conform to Headland’s pattern, showing lasting 
ambivalence to settlement schemes, and seldom staying in them for 
long. Thus we might attribute the Hadza emphasis on hunting big game 
and distributing its meat to the need to combat the attractions of village 
life and villager husbands. Yet these attractions seem weaker for Hadza 
women than for IKung women. We observe that fewer Hadza women 
marry neighbors, and of those who do, many return to the bush with 
their children. But if we are stubborn, we might suggest that IKung men 
compete (in a context of sparser big game) by performing more tasks 
about the house (building houses, making clothing, and spending more
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time with their wives), and that !Kung women are married so young 
because !Kung men try to marry them before the Bantu do!
But is a low level of hypergamy an indication of a less severe threat of 
it, or of a more successful adaptation to prevent it? Could we assess the 
threat to be greater among the Hadza? Is there demand for Hadza wives? 
One might expect the many immigrants to the Mangola area to be 
looking for wives, but few Hadza were married to them. As far as we can 
see, not many Datoga seek or take Hadza wives, unlike the Herero and 
Tswana neighbors of the !Kung.
Would a Hadza woman or a !Kung woman have more to gain by 
marrying a neighbor? Although Hadza women work longer hours than 
IKung women, it appears that they usually get more calories per hour, 
and the climate is less demanding. Hadza men apparently bring in more 
meat than !Kung men. Thus Hadza women may eat more meat than 
!Kung women, and they have as many children as the average farmer, 
while !Kung women had fewer. Hadza women are as successful at 
keeping their children alive as are !Kung women. T he bush is simply a 
better economic/reproductive alternative where the Hadza live than 
where the !Kung live. This would explain not only why fewer Hadza 
girls marry “ Swahilis” but also why some of those who have done return 
with their children to resume life as Hadza. These points do not amount 
to evidence that hypergamy is a greater threat to Hadza men. Indeed 
Bagshawe (1923) reported that during a famine among farmers around 
1917, several Isanzu girls married Hadza men.
Fertility and population increase
Wilmsen (1989) presents the argument that !Kung fertility is lowest 
among those with least access to resources. Motzafi-Haller (1990) 
implies the same. This view is easily reconciled with our own. There are 
other theories in the literature, some of them very well known such as 
the “ wealth-flows theory” ; others less well known but more in tune with 
global process theory.
Murdoch (1980) provides one of the more lucid summaries of the view 
that poverty increases fertility. He emphasizes the security provided by 
a large kin network under the unpredictable and uncontrollable 
environments of the very poor and exploited. This “people as security” 
idea resembles the argument of Draper (1989) about “people as 
resources.” Raising many children, and promoting pro-natalist beliefs 
among one’s kin and allies, may generate a usefully large network of 
exchange partners that better buffers hard times. While much has been 
made of the “reliability” of hunting and gathering, uncertainty of this
type has been discussed extensively in work on the IKung and other 
southern African foragers (e.g., Kent, chapter 1, this volume). Among 
the IKung, spatial variation is dampened by the xharo exchange system 
(Weissner 1982). Temporal variation is sometimes localized, and so it 
can be translated into spatial variation, and solved by moving to 
another locality or calling on help from distant partners or kin. Among 
the Hadza, we observed in our 1985 census data that women with more 
living siblings had more living children, which we interpret to mean 
that there may be reproductive benefits that accrue from having more 
kin. But these kin tend to live together; thus they cannot buffer spatial- 
temporal variation in resources. We have seen no mass movement of 
people from one region to another, and like Woodburn (1968b) are 
impressed with the stability of these regional populations. There is no 
record of serious shortage among the Eastern Hadza (but Bleek’s 1930 
informants told her of famine in the area of the Western Hadza which 
people had moved to avoid: Bleek 1931). As Lee (1979) reports for the 
IKung, there are accounts of farmer neighbors of the Hadza using bush 
foods in times of crop failure (Bagshawe 1923). On the other hand, 
some Hadza foods, particularly berries, seem very variable from year to 
year, especially in the time and size of the harvest.
By the standards used in accounts such as Murdoch’s (1980), the 
Hadza and the IKung are both dramatically poor, and perhaps indis- 
tinguishably so, but the theory would have to predict from the 
observed difference in fertility that the Hadza were poorer than the 
IKung. We could view the Hadza as poorer than the IKung because 
they work longer hours. But Hadza get more for their work, their 
women are fatter, their men more muscular, and their children survive 
as well.
In  Blurton Jones et al. (1992) we showed that the Hadza population 
was increasing and might have been increasing for some time. We sug­
gested that it might have been suppressed in pre-colonial (or pre­
rinderpest) times by the raids described by Obst’s informants. These 
may well have been associated with the slave trade, which continued 
until 1873 in east Africa (Sheriff 1979). Thus, even though we cannot 
muster support for the poverty theory of fertility, our favored expla­
nation of population increase, another key demographic parameter 
derives directly from global process ideas.
Poverty and parental behavior
I f  contemporary foragers are the rural proletariat (as Wilmsen 1989 and 
others suggest), perhaps we should explain their parental behavior in
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the same way as we explain differences in parental behavior between 
socioeconomic groups in other contexts, such as in industrial societies.
(a) Sociologists and psychologists have suggested that children of the 
lower classes may be trained in deference (Newson and Newson 1968, 
and references in Belsky 1984). Does this shape IKung or Hadza child­
rearing? Neither Draper nor Konner has described anything in IKung 
child-rearing that they interpret as deference training. Draper (1975:92) 
in fact describes almost the opposite. Nor can we decide which popu­
lation we should expect to show most training in deference: perhaps the 
IKung, in so far as they more often work for more powerful neighbors.
(b) There is an enormous literature on socioeconomic status differences 
in parental behavior in industrial societies. In so far as socioeconomic 
status differences in child-rearing reflect the kind of exploitation that 
global process theory holds to be so important, perhaps we should 
expect the IKung and the Hadza to differ accordingly. Lower status and 
greater poverty in industrial societies are associated with less interaction 
between parents and children, and less response by parents to child 
behavior (most clearly in respect to response to speech), more physical 
punishment, and more verbal commands and prohibitions directed to 
the child (M cLloyd 1990). Thus, very, very loosely, the Hadza more 
resemble parents of low socioeconomic status and the IKung more 
resemble higher-status parents (although their actual frequency of 
response to infant vocalization was shown by Konner [1977] to be the 
same as that of Boston working-class parents). So again global process 
theory leads us to propose that the Hadza are more exploited and 
impoverished than the IKung. We have yet to identify evidence that 
Hadza are poorer than IKung.
Meat trade and men’s subsistence strategies
Could we explain the Hadza concentration on big game and their neglect 
of trapping by a greater demand by neighbors for traded meat? Several 
contemporary descriptions of the IKung and other San peoples indicate 
that they are often employed to hunt by their richer neighbors who own 
horses and guns (Osaki 1984; K ent, chapter 6, this volume). That the 
quarry of these hunts are large game may support the premise that 
commercial hunting would lead to concentration on large game. Very 
little meat was traded by the Hadza that we have observed, but they are 
the people who live furthest from villages. Less than 5 percent of their 
food was farm produce. This would have come from relatives in villages, 
trading honey, nagging, and possibly least of all in exchange for meat.
We imagine that the demand for meat from villagers is great. The
Hadza are surrounded by dense populations of farming people 
(Walraqw and Walsanzu). Although these are mixed farmers (Iraqw 
adding pigs to the usual chickens, cattle, goats, and sheep), we have no 
reason to think that animal protein is in any less demand than elsewhere 
in Africa. Meat is often discussed when non-Hadza (of any level in 
society) meet Hadza. In  1992, several instances of trading meat were 
observed and they seemed to be associated with and arise from the latest 
settlement efforts (the “Hadza Centrement Scheme” and a newly initi­
ated Pentecostal mission).
Another external influence is probably important. Trade in wild game 
is illegal in Tanzania, and Hadza seem quite aware of this. The game 
laws may be more effectively enforced on the Hadza than in the remote 
areas of Ngamiland. But this would allow !Kung to conduct more trade, 
and if larger game is better for trade, the meat-trade theory should lead 
us to expect the !Kung and not the Hadza to specialize in large game. 
However, the relative scarcity of large game in !Kung country might 
offset this, an ecological factor lowering the trading opportunity.
Avoiding Datoga and other strangers
Hadza show some fear and distrust of their Datoga herder neighbors, 
and of strangers of any sort. Some Hadza attribute their flight from the 
sound of a vehicle to the fear that it is “ the government” coming to settle 
them (see also Woodburn 1979). But we should note that unfortunate 
experiences at the hand of strangers go back beyond the turn of the 
century. Obst (1912) was told of neighbors coming to hunt elephants 
(apparently Isanzu and Sukuma, not Europeans); they also captured 
women and children. He was told of the peace that followed the decline 
in the elephant population.
Over the years there are said to have been some killings of Hadza by 
Datoga, and some retaliation by Hadza. Bagshawe (1923) reports:
Once, according to tradition, some Kangeju [Hadza] killed an elephant and 
obtained a few goats from a native stranger in exchange for the ivory. Next 
morning the goats strayed into the bush and were lost, for all were eating 
elephant meat and no one bothered to follow them. The feasting Kangeju were 
attacked by Tatoga, who declared that the goats had been stolen from them, and 
many were killed. Their first experiment as pastoralists ended in disaster and 
they have never repeated it.
For the Hadza, such incidents may have been repeated sufficiently often 
to create a persistent fear that has efficiently cut off herding as a possible 
way of life or direction for “ development.”
Datoga traditions by which the killer of an “ enemy of the people”
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(most often a lion) is lavishly rewarded may have led young Datoga once 
in a while to classify Hadza as such. Hadza say that their fear of Datoga 
is the reason why Hadza women forage as a group, and demand the 
company of at least one male with poison arrows (even if  a young 
teenager). Datoga are used by adults as “bogeymen” to persuade chil­
dren. Datoga have been known to capture children to raise as herders 
(Sellen, pers. comm.). A Hadza informant told us of one Hadza child 
held temporarily by Datoga, and of a vigorous raid on a Hadza camp 
some 25 years ago from which all the children escaped. Despite this, 
Hadza children are often the only daytime occupants of the camp, or are 
in the bush as a small group of mixed ages. In complete contrast, Datoga 
are the main customers for Hadza honey, which they need to make mead 
for frequent and important ceremonial and political occasions.
In  O’Connell et al. (1990) we suggested that models of the economics 
of bone transport might need to take account of the Hadza wish not to 
linger at lowland kill sites where encounters with Datoga might be 
likely. It remains to be seen whether doing this enables us to account for 
any more of the variance in which skeletal parts are transported from kill 
site to home site.
National politics
Global process theory claims that even the “remotest and most isolated” 
locations are influenced by the global process, by the state, and by its 
relation to other states. Thus the different political systems of Botswana 
and Tanzania might affect the IKung and the Hadza differently. Social­
ism claims to promote equality between individuals, sexes, parents and 
children, and neighbors. This could be a reason for the apparently 
weaker impact of neighbors on the Hadza, although it has not stopped 
substantial parts of their land being taken or devastated. Furthermore, 
the direct or indirect impact of the state (e.g., threat of state power by 
those who would settle the Hadza, in the last decade with no authority 
from the state) has been conspicuous from time to time (Woodburn 
1979, 1988; Kaare 1988). We observe that the foragers in the socialist 
state show greater separation between men and women, and less atten­
tion by parents to children’s interests. This is the opposite of the 
intuitive “global process” expectation.
Encapsulation: Is Woodburn describing an influence o f  the global
process?
Woodburn (1988) describes the way Hadza maintain their independence 
from their neighbors. He argues that their “ immediate return” system
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allows them to avoid lasting trade or work arrangements, and thus to 
resist absorption by agricultural neighbors. He suggests that this may be 
why so many of the forager populations that survived into this century 
were immediate-return societies. Nonetheless, he argues that the Hadza 
were not changed into an immediate-return society by the need to stay 
separate from neighbors.
But given that Hadza wish to preserve their identity, and given the 
nature of the outside forces that have impinged on them (“farm or else 
stay backward!”), then their endurance, their presence as foragers in the 
twentieth century, is partly explained by global process theory. The 
global process demands that they farm or perish, and trying to farm in 
the land that is now left to them also means to perish, leaving occasional 
labor for farmers as their only obvious livelihood. Because they refuse, 
the process leaves them little alternative but to cut themselves off and to 
avoid lasting entanglements with the outside world. Having done that, 
there is little left for them to adapt to but each other, and the natural 
environment. Thus global process theory becomes a part of the eco­
logical explanation of Hadza behavior.
We are of course obliged to try to explain why Hadza wish to preserve 
their identity! In his hypergamy paper, Bailey (1988) implies that it 
would be mainly men who are concerned about this. I f  Hadza get too 
close to neighbors, Hadza men will not get wives and will not leave 
descendants. But we have no evidence of gender differences in the 
tendency to move away from “ Swahilis.”
The issue is complicated additionally because a further consequence 
of the immediate-return habit seems to be loss of land. Welcoming 
outsiders into their land, Hadza ask only gifts of small amounts of maize 
from time to time. When in due course the presence of the outsiders 
becomes problematic, the Hadza simply move away. As is now evident 
to a few educated younger Hadza, they thus sacrifice land and habitat 
and their long-term security (the habitat quickly becomes almost desert 
under the destructive farming practices of their neighbors) for tiny 
short-term gains.
Conclusions
We have suggested that influences of neighbors and the global economy 
can easily be incorporated within the behavioral ecology approach. 
Neighbors modify the costs and benefits of alternative courses of action 
just as do flora, fauna, climate, geomorphology, and friends and rela­
tives. We suggested that the lower cost o f Hadza children, determined 
by the greater opportunities for children to acquire food for themselves,
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allows women to invest in higher fertility and devote less effort to their 
children’s survival, and allows Hadza men to invest less in child-care 
and more in affairs or new marriages. Since the opportunity for men to 
make new marriages depends upon women being available, the inci­
dence of marriage to men of neighboring tribes enters into the issue. 
More !Kung women marry men of other tribes. Thus neighbors, and the 
higher costs of desertion, work in favor of !Kung men staying with their 
spouses and investing in them and their children. Data support the 
implication that fathers have more effect on survival of children among 
the !Kung than among the Hadza.
But when we looked at some other influences of neighbors suggested 
in the literature, things did not go so smoothly. Much literature suggests 
that poverty increases fertility, and makes for harsher child rearing, 
which would imply that Hadza are poorer or more exploited than 
!Kung. Yet Hadza get more food for their work, and are heavier. Large 
game may be better for trade, yet Hadza, who specialize in big game, 
seem to be not heavily involved in meat trading. While the strongly 
socialist government of Tanzania aims for equality between tribes and 
sexes, and continued Hadza autonomy may be partly an outcome of this 
ideology, the sexes are described as opposed among Hadza and equal 
among the !Kung. On the other hand, the apparently steady increase in 
Hadza population is probably best explained by the cessation of raids by 
neighbors during the last century. Clearly one cannot assume that 
potential influences of neighbors and the wider world are either 
inevitably effective, or inevitably detrimental. Therefore, the global 
process as a cause of behavior becomes one of the many ecological and 
economic influences affecting people and their strategies.
Our evolutionary ecology framework drew attention to a series of 
interdependent differences in behavior and reproduction between the 
Hadza and the !Kung. T he apparent ease with which Hadza children 
can help provide their own food lowers the reproductive penalties of 
more frequent births and harsher treatment by mother, and lowers the 
penalties of desertion by father. We claim this explains the higher 
fertility, less attentive child rearing, and greater separation between the 
sexes among the Hadza. Evolutionary ecology generates testable pre­
dictions about a variety of aspects of behavior from a small number of 
premises. Although many think it unwise to expect models based on 
natural selection to apply to people, the attraction of logically consistent 
models that make testable predictions about differences may outweigh 
these reservations.
These differences may follow from small (but we believe crucial) 
differences in the environment: the spatial separation of water and food
in most of IKung country and their intermingling in most of Hadza 
country, and the resource type and possible return rates. It is important 
to realize that we do not claim to have created a general rule, such as that 
wherever water and food are intermingled there will be sexist societies! 
We think this aspect of geography only shows up as important because 
many other costs and benefits o f behavior have been so similar in the 
Hadza and IKung environments and lifeways. The rule that we espouse 
is much more general: behavior will be that which combines costs and 
benefits in such a way that more descendants are left than are left by 
behaving in another way. The actual costs and benefits, and thus the 
optimal behavior, will depend on local circumstances (and the behavior 
of other individuals) and it would be difficult to generalize about how 
they will play out. Thus we often see ourselves as “evolutionary par- 
ticularists!” Note that this formulation excludes no kind of material 
influence upon costs or benefits.
Although we are likely to pursue our comparisons between the Hadza 
and the IKung, it is important to compare other groups, or larger 
samples, and, as the reader of other chapters in this volume will readily 
agree, it is likely to be chastening. We expect it will strengthen the 
“evolutionary particularist” view, reducing emphasis on the importance 
of any single environmental factor (such as ease of foraging by children), 
and increasing emphasis on cost-benefit analyses that pay attention to 
more variables. For instance, if we begin to think about the fertility of 
Hadza and Ache, we immediately see that Ache high fertility does not 
entail specially successful foraging by children. Details about the effects 
of children on women’s subsistence seem unlikely to explain much 
about Ache fertility, or about the differences of Ache from IKung and 
Hadza. The greater proportion of food acquired by Ache men must be a 
much more significant factor for this comparison.
T he arguments outlined here are unfinished. W ithin our presentation 
of evolutionary ecology we have used provisional results or impressions 
from investigations that are still incomplete. Our answer to the critique 
of ecological approaches by writers such as Wilmsen must also be 
regarded as incomplete because global process theorists should be able 
to generate more competing explanations for the phenomena than we 
have discussed here. But if global process theory is taken to imply 
“change based upon opportunistic responses to new economic, social, 
and market possibilities” (Denbow 1990:126), then it can draw attention 
to costs and benefits of behavior that we might otherwise have ignored. 
Some are, once noticed (like “hypergamy,” and opportunities to trade 
meat), easily incorporated into the evolutionary ecology approach. 
Others simply failed, or are more difficult to test, including some that 
more obviously compete with evolutionary ecology explanations, such
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as the implication from child rearing and from high fertility that Hadza 
are poorer or more downtrodden than IKung. The difficulty arises 
merely because we cannot pin down the concept of poverty (it may refer 
to many variables -  from food intake to control or extent of options 
available, all of which need further definition but can be usefully 
translated into costs and benefits accruing to the key participants from 
alternative actions).
Elsewhere we (Blurton Jones et al. 1992) and others (e.g., Schrire 
1990) have suggested that the global process of interaction between 
peoples tends to produce similarities between contemporary hunters 
and gatherers. But in principle, as we and other contributors to this 
volume have made quite evident, global process theory should also be 
able to account for differences, because the global process may act in 
different ways in different localities. Not only are there differences in 
the behavior of the herder neighbors of the Hadza and the IKung but the 
demands of the larger world system have shown differences in the two 
localities during the past century or so. Ivory has been extracted from 
both localities. But while cattle were extracted from Namibia, slaves 
were extracted from east Africa. People have migrated from the 
remotest corners of Botswana to work in the mines in South Africa. 
Little or no long-range demand for labor seems to have impinged on the 
Hadza since the end of slave export from east Africa in 1873. D is­
placement of people was a major event in Namibia and Botswana in 
1904—6. Herders were displaced into and expanded into Hadza country 
much more recently, but historical and archaeological evidence suggests 
that some have been there from time to time during the past several 
hundred years.
T he assault on anthropology from global process theory is o f course 
much wider than a call to attend to more factors influencing cost-benefit 
equations. Revisionists claim that anthropologists err in their concept of 
separable cultures, err in writing only of a “time slice” assumed to 
represent a lasting and stable condition, and err in selectively perceiving 
constancy and contentment where there is neither. (Both evolutionary 
ecologists and revisionists criticize anthropology for neglecting conflicts 
of interest.) Revisionists argue that anthropologists ignore, or “peel 
away,” crucial events and lasting pressures of “history” or the “ social 
relations of production.” But anthropologists are likely to continue 
these habits as long as none of the revisionist concepts is explained 
clearly or dissected very usefully. So long as global process theory offers 
neither a clear, explicit theory of human behavior, nor a criterion for the 
truth of its own claims, it cannot claim to be a serious theory, at least not 
a serious scientific theory. But its vigorous challenges may continue to 
stimulate reexaminations of many issues in anthropology.
